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ABSTRACT
Under certain conditions, such as security crises, an integrated 
external EU counter-terrorism policy can emerge without 
leading to the supra-nationalisation of policy-making. This 
paper analyses the role of the High Representative for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy with the objective of assessing the 
influence that such figure can have on the governance of EU 
counter-terrorism policies. It does so by assessing the EU’s 
response to three security crises, namely: the 9/11 attacks and 
the subsequent bombings in Madrid (2004) and London (2005); 
the Arab Spring and the following destabilisation of the Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA); and the emergence and spread 
of Da’esh.
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From 9/11 to Da’esh: What Role for the High 
Representative and the External Dimension of EU 
Counter-Terrorism Policies?
by Maria Giulia Amadio Viceré*
Introduction
Any act of terrorism is unpredictable. Yet, there is an element of predictability in 
the sentiments triggered by such acts. Ferocious beheadings, cruel shootings and 
violent executions bring a common sense of fear and frustration that, generally, 
leads to enhanced cooperation among the different actors and institutions of the 
political entity under threat. At a time in which the EU and its citizens are facing a 
rapid increase of violent extremism and terrorist attacks, there is a strong functional 
argument for rationalising and improving a traditionally neglected niche of EU 
foreign and security action, namely counterterrorism. In light of the track record of 
the past and considering the challenges ahead posed by the emergence and spread 
of transnational terrorist networks, it is unlikely that single nation states will be able 
to tackle such phenomena individually. The role played by the High Representative 
(HR) for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy could be crucial in bringing together 
Member States and institutions in order to increase the coordination and, therefore, 
effectiveness of European foreign and security policies.
Admittedly, political will and consensus on the fight against terrorism are directly 
correlated to the level of threat perception.1 Yet, conceiving an effective European 
response to such phenomena necessarily implies a step further: the emergence of 
integrated action among Member States and institutions. In this context, the aim of 
the paper is to assess whether and to what extent, the existence of security crises, 
are a condition for the HR to act as a “policy entrepreneur”2 in EU counterterrorism 
1 Javier Argomaniz, “Before and After Lisbon: Legal Implementation as the ‘Achilles Heel’ in EU 
Counter-Terrorism?”, in European Security, Vol. 19, No. 2 (June 2011), p. 308.
2 The definition of policy entrepreneur used in the paper is the one adopted by Flavia Zanon, 
* Maria Giulia Amadio Viceré is a PhD candidate in Political Sciences, Department of Political 
Sciences, LUISS Guido Carli University. E-mail: mamadio@luiss.it.
. Paper prepared for the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), September 2015. An earlier version of 
this paper was presented at the workshop “Euro-Mediterranean Security: Can New Dynamism 
Be Injected in the EU Mediterranean Policy?”, held at the Institute of European Studies of the 
University of Malta on 13 May 2015.
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efforts.
The paper is structured as follows. First, it outlines the position of the HR in EU 
counterterrorism and clarifies why it is relevant to analyse the role played by such 
figure to assess developments in this field. Second, it examines the influence of the 
HR in the alleged improvement of these policies by considering the EU’s response 
to three security crises: the bombings in Madrid (2004) and London (2005) and the 
political climate generated by the terrorist attacks of 9/11;3 the Arab Spring and 
the following destabilisation of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA); and the 
emergence and spread of Da’esh. Finally, the paper draws some lessons from the 
analysis. Certain situations can offer fertile ground for the HR to play an active role 
towards integrating the EU’s external counterterrorism efforts, without necessarily 
leading to its supra-nationalisation. Providing such analysis is crucial not only to 
identify the potential areas of cooperation, but also to highlight the limits of what 
appears to be an essentially contingent approach.
1. The High Representative’s institutional basis and the EU 
external counterterrorism policy
European security is at stake. Terrorism is not new to the old continent, but such 
matters have been traditionally - and continue to be - analysed through national 
lenses.4 Since the 1970s, Spain has faced the Basque Euzkadi Ta Askatosuma (ETA) 
and the United Kingdom the Irish Republican Army; but these terrorist experiences 
were mainly the result of secessionist movements. Other states, such as Italy, with 
the Brigate Rosse, Germany, with the Badher-Meinhof, and France, with Action 
Directe, have been victims of political leftist terrorism. Undeniably, the largely 
domestic character of the threat European states have had to face historically has 
not led them to consider a possible international dimension of terrorism.5 Yet, the 
attacks in the US and in Europe, at the beginning of the 2000s, put a spotlight on 
the emergence and consolidation of transnational terrorist networks. Terrorism, 
which up until that time was mainly a national concern stemming from domestic 
cleavages, had evolved into a transnational threat necessarily calling for an 
integrated EU response. It is in this period that it is possible to identify the first 
seeds of external counterterrorism policies at the European level.
who draws on Roberts and King’s work. See Flavia Zanon, The High Representative for the CFSP 
and EU security culture: mediator or policy entrepreneur?, PhD Dissertation, University of Trento, 
April 2012, http://eprints-phd.biblio.unitn.it/785; and Nancy C. Roberts and Paula J. King, “Policy 
Entrepreneurs: Their Activity Structure and Function in the Policy Process”, in Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory, Vol. 1, No. 2 (April 1991), p. 147-175.
3 Maria Giulia Amadio Viceré, “EU counterterrorism efforts and the role of High Representative 
Mogherini”, in Aspenia online, 7 July 2015, http://www.aspeninstitute.it/aspenia-online/node/5801.
4 Javier Argomaniz, The EU and Counter-Terrorism. Politics, Polity and Policies after 9/11, 
Abingdon and New York, Routledge, 2011, p. 3.
5 Ibid.
IA
I 
W
O
R
K
IN
G
 P
A
P
E
R
S
 1
5
 |
 2
9
 -
 S
E
P
T
E
M
B
E
R
 2
0
15
4
©
 2
0
15
 I
A
I
From 9/11 to Da’esh: What Role for the High Representative 
and the External Dimension of EU Counter-Terrorism Policies?
IS
S
N
 2
2
8
0
-4
3
4
1 
| I
S
B
N
 9
78
-8
8
-9
8
6
5
0
-5
3
-8
More than a decade has passed since the terrorist attacks at the beginning of the 
2000s in the US and Europe. Nonetheless, external counterterrorism policy is still 
considered a niche area for EU action and remains largely underdeveloped, in stark 
contrast with other areas in which the EU stands out as a political entity capable 
of making a difference in the international arena.6 As a matter of fact, EU external 
counterterrorism can be conceived as a “multi-level/cross-institutional” subject, 
which encompasses both internal and external policies while calling for a combined 
array of state and EU actors, institutions, agencies and instruments.7 The counter-
effect of the multifaceted nature of the EU is that the institutionalisation process of 
this field of activity has been – and continues to be – affected by the supranational/
intergovernmental separation around which the EU is structured.
Historically, a security crisis is a propitious moment for giving greater priority to 
security objectives and for granting more extensive powers to the executive branch.8 
Yet, the EU is a compound polity9 and identifying what its foreign policy executive 
branch is might be not as straightforward as in the case of national entities. Ever 
since its introduction, the figure of the High Representative has found itself at the 
crossroads of the divisions among Member States, which creates a certain degree 
of institutional complexity, if not ambiguity. The institutional post of the HR was 
first introduced to enhance the effectiveness of EU international actions after the 
crisis in the Western Balkans. The post was created by the Treaty of Amsterdam 
as the High Representative (HR) for the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) in 1997.10 The institutional constraints faced by the first HR emerged very 
quickly. The HR was intended as a Secretary-General of the Council, tasked with 
assisting the Presidency, and had no significant independent powers. Whilst at the 
European Council the HR’s role was highly limited by the national Heads of States 
and Government, at the level of the General Affairs and External Relations Council, 
the national Foreign Ministers could exercise strong influence over the HR.11 As 
a consequence, the HR was not encouraged to express autonomous positions 
that had not been formally endorsed by the Council itself. At the same time, the 
existence of an External Relations Commissioner caused coordination problems. 
It is against this restraining institutional background that Javier Solana, the first 
to occupy the HR post, faced the security crisis stemming from the bombings in 
Madrid (2004) and London (2005).
6 Maria Giulia Amadio Viceré, “An opportunity for EU foreign policy: Mogherini as High 
Representative and her tasks”, in Aspenia online, 5 December 2014, http://www.aspeninstitute.it/
aspenia-online/node/3811.
7 Bruno Oliveira Martins and Laura C. Ferreira-Perreira, “Stepping Inside? CSDP Missions and 
Counter-Terrorism”, in European Security, Vol. 21, No. 4 (December 2012), p. 537-556.
8 John E. Owens and Riccardo Pelizzo (eds.), The ‘War on Terror’ and the Growth of the Executive 
Power? A Comparative Analysis, Abingdon and New York, Routledge, 2010.
9 Sergio Fabbrini, Compound Democracies. Why the United States and Europe are Becoming 
Similar, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010.
10 Article 18.3.
11 The Foreign Minister of the state holding the Council Presidency was still chairing the General 
Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC).
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In the post-Lisbon era, EU counterterrorism policy is still compounded by the 
supranational/intergovernmental division characterising the functioning of EU 
foreign and security policy more broadly. Admittedly, the principle of coherence 
in the external action of the EU is provided for in the 2009 Lisbon Treaty,12 together 
with provisions concerning the achievement of closer cooperation among police 
forces13 and judicial cooperation in criminal matters related to terrorism.14 However, 
prompted by the sensitive nature of the matter, national governments maintained, 
in large part, their own counterterrorism institutions and policies, with the most 
relevant separations pertaining to their national intelligence services. No specific 
arrangement regarding EU counterterrorism is envisaged in the 2009 legal text. 
Certainly, the fight against terrorism is mentioned as the general objective of the 
Petersberg tasks.15 In addition to this, both the mutual defence clause16 and the 
solidarity clause17 provide that Member States should support each other following 
an attack. Yet, these clauses “do not oblige mutual assistance to prevent attacks,” 
substantially avoiding making territorial defence a Treaty obligation.18
Against such a legal background, the HR is charged with providing coordination of 
EU external action broadly defined, including counterterrorism. In an effort to further 
enhance the international profile of the EU, the Lisbon Treaty attributed to the HR the 
capacity of Vice President of the Commission. However, the delineation of the role 
of the HR is not clearly defined in the legal text. The Lisbon Treaty “remains unsure 
whether to conceptualise the HR as an integral part of the government function 
or as an administrative infrastructure.” Because of this, “the post of HR fluctuates 
between political autonomy and administrative support.”19 In her/his capacity as 
chair of the Foreign Affairs Council, for instance, the HR can elaborate the Union’s 
external action. Yet, this has to be done on the basis of strategic guidelines provided 
by the European Council, composed by Heads of States or Government.20 Along the 
same lines, “[w]here there is a lack of consensus among the member states, there 
is no policy position which he/she may represent.” Thus, without approval he/she 
“must, however, remain silent as a matter of legal principle.”21 The arrangement of 
12 Article 21 and Article 26.
13 Article 29 TFEU.
14 Article 31 TFEU.
15 Article 42 TEU.
16 Article 42.7 TEU.
17 See Article 222 TEU.
18 Gijs de Vries, “The Nexus between EU Crisis Management and Counter-Terrorism”, in Steven 
Blockmans (ed.), The European Union and Crisis Management. Policy and Legal Aspects, The 
Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2008, p. 357, http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/20080900_
cscp_chapter_vries.pdf.
19 Daniel Thym, “The Intergovernmental Constitution of the EU’s Foreign, Security and Defence 
Executive”, in European Constitutional Law Review, Vol. 7, No. 3 (October 2011), p. 457.
20 Article 16 (6) TEU.
21 Daniel Thym, “The Intergovernmental Constitution of the EU’s Foreign, Security & Defence 
Executive”, cit., p. 456.
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the Council’s working groups reflects, on a practical level, the extent to which the 
HR can undertake a pro-active role; it largely depends on a convergence among 
Member States’ strategic preferences. The Foreign Affairs Council, chaired by the 
HR, deals exclusively with the external action of the EU. However, it is the rotating 
Presidency that chairs the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) 
and the supporting working groups within that institution.22 As a consequence 
of this institutional set up, before a decision reaches the level of the Council, it 
may have been already strongly shaped by contingent national influences.23 For 
all these reasons, whilst the Lisbon Treaty attributes to the reshaped figure of the 
HR/VP “extensive agenda-setting, decision-shaping and implementing powers,” 
personification does not necessarily lead to federalisation.24
Bearing all this in mind, before assessing the role of the HR during the security 
crises under study, three main considerations should be abstracted from the 
analysis of this institutional post with regard to EU counterterrorism policies. First, 
both before and after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the HR post has been 
characterised by a certain level of institutional ambiguity “generating contradictory 
expectations about its future.”25 This level of uncertainty is mostly represented by 
the vagueness of the job description, which makes it unclear whether to consider 
the HR a bureaucrat or a politician.26 Second, in both cases, although to different 
degrees,27 the convergence among Member States and institutions’ interests 
appears as a necessary condition for the HR to act as a policy entrepreneur. When 
such convergence takes place, against the background of a complex, but at the 
same time fluid institutional system, the person occupying such post might have 
an authentic choice on the role to play: “between, on the one hand, a secretary and 
on the other hand a general, between a follower and a leader, between reactive 
and proactive instincts, between a coordinator and a doer, between a tactician and 
a strategist.”28 Last but not least, whilst historical contingencies, such as security 
crises,29 might offer the functional pressure for such alignment of strategic interests 
22 This arrangement applies to both the General Affairs Council, entitled with horizontal 
coordinating functions, and the Justice and Home Affairs Configuration, crucial in terrorist 
matters. The Council Working Group on the International Aspects of Terrorism (COTER), the 
Foreign Relations Counsellors Working Party (RELEX) and the Political and Military Group (PMG) 
are Presidency-chaired, as well.
23 Daniel Thym, “The Intergovernmental Constitution of the EU’s Foreign, Security & Defence 
Executive”, cit., p. 456.
24 Ibid.
25 Flavia Zanon, The High Representative for the CFSP and EU security culture…, cit., p. 3.
26 Ibid.
27 With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty the HR has turned into Vice President of the 
Commission. Such modification should give to the post enhanced coordination powers compared 
to the post introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam.
28 Joylon Howorth, “Catherine Ashton’s Five-Year Term: A Difficult Assessment”, in Les Cahiers 
européens de Sciences Po, No. 03/2014 (December 2014), p. 20, http://www.cee.sciences-po.fr/en/
publications/les-cahiers-europeens/2014/doc/1142/raw.
29 On security crises and EU counter-terrorism, see Xiana Barros, “The External Dimension of EU 
Counter-Terrorism: The Challenges of the European Parliament in Front of the European Court of 
Justice”, in European Security, Vol. 21, No. 4 (December 2012), p. 518-536.
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to occur, it seems evident that whether the HR would play an active part largely 
rests also on the personal qualities of the person occupying such post and his or 
her willingness to do so.
2. The first High Representative Solana: steering the ship towards 
unexplored waters
During Javier Solana’s tenure, the “ideational convergence”30 among institutions 
and Member States on the necessity for the EU to step up the fight against terrorism 
stemmed from the pressure caused by the bombings in Madrid and London and 
against the background of the political climate generated by the attacks in the 
US. Thus, during the period under consideration, Member States and institutions 
generally abstained from entering into contradiction with each other with regard 
to the fight against terrorism. In response to the 9/11 events, the Director-General of 
the Commission for Justice and Home Affairs, Sir Daniel Fortescue, stated that the 
EU and the US could be drawn together by cooperating.31 The Spanish Presidency 
of the EU, in turn, publicly declared that there was a need for the fight against 
terrorism to be added to the Union’s activity.32 Along the same line, in November 
2001, the European Council adopted an Action Plan on combating terrorism and, 
in June 2002, Member States even agreed on a common definition of terrorism, 
primarily based on a list of terrorist offences.33 Against such uniform background 
and notwithstanding the provisions of the Treaty of Amsterdam, Solana managed 
to act not merely as administrative support but as policy entrepreneur. He did so 
by influencing the entire policymaking cycle of the EU response to the above-
mentioned security crisis.
Already before the first attacks on the European continent had taken place, the 
High Representative actively contributed to shape the debate and formulate ideas 
about EU counterterrorism through speeches, public declarations and drafting 
of policy documents. By framing terrorism as an urgent threat the EU had to 
address and by stressing the need for a nexus between counterterrorism policies 
and the European Security and Defence Policy, he set the basis for a pro-active 
stance for the EU in this field. The first seeds of EU external counterterrorism 
can be found in the European Security Strategy (ESS), A Secure Europe in a Better 
World, adopted in December 2003. The official document, prepared by Solana 
and his team, identified terrorism as among the key threats the EU had to face, 
30 Christopher J. Bickerton, Dermot Hodson and Uwe Puetter, “The New Intergovernmentalism: 
European Integration in the Post-Maastricht Era”, in Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 53, 
No. 4 (July 2015), p. 709.
31 Christian Kaunert, “The External Dimension of EU Counter-Terrorism Relations: Competences, 
Interests and Institutions”, in Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 22, No. 1 (2009), p. 55, http://
dx.doi.org/10.1080/09546550903409551.
32 Gijs de Vries, “The Nexus between EU Crisis Management and Counter-Terrorism”, cit.
33 Council of the European Union, Council Framework Decision on combating terrorism, 13 June 
2002, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=celex:32002F0475.
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stating that “Europe is both a target and a base for such terrorism” and that “[c]
oncerted European action is indispensable.”34 The strategy also envisaged “support 
for third countries in combating terrorism in the spectrum of crisis management 
operations to be covered by the Union, along with joint disarmament operations 
and security sector reform.”35 Whilst some observers have considered the ESS as 
not particularly influential, others have argued that it showed the emergence of 
a “new operational and cohesive approach to security” at the European level.36 
However the case may be, the subsequent release of the Council 2004 Conceptual 
Framework for the contribution of ESDP to the fight against terrorism37 explicitly 
stated the HR’s much-wanted nexus between the European Security and Defence 
Policy (ESDP) and counterterrorism. Specific measures concerning EU policies to 
fight external terrorism were also subsequently included in the conclusions of the 
December 2004 Council.
The HR played an active part in formulating policy proposals and even managed to 
gain room for manoeuvre in the decision-making and implementation phases of 
the EU response to the attacks in Madrid and London. In a report to the EU Ministers 
of the Interior in June 2004, Solana made several propositions on terrorism and 
intelligence co-operation. On that occasion he proposed to charge “the EU’s 
Joint Situation Centre (SITCEN) with the production of intelligence analyses.”38 
The merging “between information from internal and external secret services 
in SITCEN could help bridge the gap between the Second and Third Pillar of the 
European Union.”39 Notably, SitCen’s counterterrorist unit became operational not 
even six months after Solana presented the report.
Admittedly, the most evident institutional modification to counter-terrorism, 
during Solana’s tenure, was the introduction of the Office of the Counter-
Terrorism Coordinator (CTC). The European Council welcomed “the decision [of] 
High Representative Solana to appoint Mr. Gijs de Vries to the position of Counter-
34 Council of the European Union, European Security Strategy. A secure Europe in a better world, 12 
December 2003, p. 3, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf.
35 Gijs de Vries, “The Nexus between EU Crisis Management and Counter-Terrorism”, cit., p. 356.
36 Flavia Zanon, The High Representative for the CFSP and EU security culture…, cit., p. 123. See also 
Asle Toje, “The 2003 European Union Security Strategy: A Critical Appraisal”, in European Foreign 
Affairs Review, Vol. 10, No. 1 (2005), p. 117-133; and Alyson J.K. Bailes, “The European Security 
Strategy. An Evolutionary History”, in SIPRI Policy Papers, No. 10 (February 2005), http://books.
sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=190.
37 Council of the European Union, Conceptual Framework on the ESDP dimension of the fight 
against terrorism (14797/04), 18 November 2004, http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/
ST-14797-2004-INIT/en/pdf.
38 Council of the European Union, Summary of remarks by Javier Solana, EU High Representative 
for the CFSP, on Terrorism and Intelligence Co-operation, Justice and Home Affairs Council 
Meeting, Luxembourg, 8 June 2004, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/
pressdata/en/declarations/80852.pdf.
39 Jelle van Buuren, Secret Truth. The EU Joint Situation Centre, Amsterdam, Eurowatch, August 
2009, p. 11, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2009/aug/SitCen2009.pdf.
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Terrorism Coordinator” in March 2004, following the train bombing in Madrid.40 
This institutional figure was to work under the direction of the HR. His or her 
tasks, according to Solana, included analysing the work done so far in countering 
terrorism with the aim of highlighting possible improvements; drafting preparatory 
work for ministers of the interior meeting in the Council; and monitoring Member 
States’ implementation of decisions taken at the European level.
When, in 2007, Gilles de Kerchove replaced de Vries as CTC, the HR issued a press 
release and took the opportunity to include a new task for the EU anti-terror chief, 
namely to ensure that the EU would play a pro-active role in the fight against 
terrorism.41 Arguing that circumstances had changed since the first mandate was 
agreed and that “it is for intelligent people to adapt to the new circumstances,” 
Solana stated that the new coordinator should have a “deeper” mandate and enjoy 
“a much closer relationship” with EU governments and institutions.42 The HR’s 
pursuit of an enhanced role of the CTC is particularly relevant when one considers 
that the position had been left vacant for four months and that “disagreements 
over the exact scope of the job are believed to have prompted de Vries to quit and 
for his replacement to be delayed.”43 Remarkably, the new appointment took place 
“after a summer marked by failed and foiled terrorist plots in Germany, Denmark 
and the UK, which once again revived political interest in counter-terrorism.”44
With the attacks in London, in July 2005, EU counter-terrorism policies received 
further impetus. Whilst Member States agreed on accelerating the Action Plan on 
Combatting Terrorism, along the lines of Solana’s quest for enhanced EU activities 
in this field, the Commission’s Communication A strategy on the external dimension 
of the area of freedom, security and justice set an approach for reinforcing “the 
justice, freedom and security aspects” of the EU’s external relations policy.45 The 
same year, the adoption of the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy (EUCT), a first 
comprehensive strategic approach to terrorism, provided the strategic basis for 
enhanced cooperation among EU institutions and Member States. The British EU 
Presidency and the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, working under the direction 
of Solana, prepared the document. Significantly, each of the four pillars of EU 
40 Council of the European Union, Declaration on Combating Terrorism (7906/04), 29 March 2004, 
par. 14, http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-7906-2004-INIT/en/pdf.
41 Isabel Skrine, “The Counter-Terrorism Coordinator”, in QCEA Briefing Papers, No. 15 (May 2012), 
http://www.qcea.org/?p=5109.
42 “Belgian appointed new EU counter-terrorism co-ordinator”, in EurActiv, 20 September 2007, 
http://www.euractiv.com/node/200836.
43 DPA News, “Solana appoints new EU Counter-Terrorism coordinator”, in Digital Journal, 19 
September 2007, http://www.digitaljournal.com/article/230281.
44 Alex Mackenzie et al., “The European Union Counter-terrorism Coordinator and the External 
Dimension of the European Union Counter-terrorism Policy”, in Perspectives on European Politics 
and Society, Vol 14, No. 3 (2013), p. 328.
45 European Commission, A strategy on the external dimension of the area of freedom, security 
and justice (COM/2005/491), 12 October 2005, p. 4, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/
TXT/?uri=celex:52005DC0491.
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counter-terrorism action46 contained in the strategy envisages key priorities for 
external action.47
Finally, the report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy 
confirmed the HR’s commitment to the development of this area. In the official 
document, presented in December 2008, Solana argued, with specific regard to 
the fight against terrorism, that “better co-ordination, transparency and flexibility 
are needed across different agencies at national and European level.” Whilst this 
was already identified in the ESS five years earlier, “progress has been slow and 
incomplete,” he warned.48
3. Lady Ashton’s mandate as High Representative: when terrorism 
was at the doorstep, but still asking for permission
The new Treaty had just entered into force when the Arab Spring broke out. The 
events of the Arab Spring led to the destabilisation of the MENA region, generating a 
security crisis for the EU. Whilst no major attacks had been carried out on European 
soil, the risk of a spread of transnational terrorism in the European neighbourhood 
was well known in Brussels. Already in April 2011, the EU terrorism and situation 
trend report, issued by EUROPOL warned that EU countries saw a 50 percent jump 
in the number of arrests linked to Islamist terrorism. With specific regard to the Arab 
Spring, the document notes: “should Arab expectations [of political reform] not be 
met, the consequence may be a surge in support for those terrorist organisations.”49 
Gilles de Kerchove, the CTC, spoke on the risks as well.50 All this notwithstanding, 
the counter-terrorism legacy of Lady (Catherine) Ashton’s tenure has been largely 
inconsistent compared to the latent risk provided by the transition in the MENA 
region. As Howorth exhaustively puts it, during the Arab Spring “unfortunately 
for Ashton, in her capacity as HR-VP, she was caught in the middle of the chaotic 
responses forthcoming from the various Member States and proved incapable of 
leading an orchestra that was already playing in cacophonic disharmony.”51
46 Council of the European Union, The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy 
(14469/4/05 REV 4), 30 November 2005, http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/
srv?l=EN&f=ST+14469+2005+REV+4.
47 Bruno Oliveira Martins and Laura C. Ferreira-Perreira, “Stepping Inside?”, cit.
48 High Representative of the Union, Report on the Implementation of the European Security 
Strategy. Providing Security in a Changing World (S407/08), 11 December 2008, http://www.
consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/104630.pdf.
49 EUROPOL, TE-SAT 2011. EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report, April 2011, p. 6, http://dx.doi.
org/10.2813/14705.
50 Johanna Somers, “EU anti-terror chief highlights Arab Spring risks”, in Reuters, 5 September 
2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/05/us-eu-arabspring-risk-idUSTRE7843TV20110905.
51 Joylon Howorth, “Catherine Ashton’s Five-Year Term: A Difficult Assessment”, cit., p. 15.
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Against such a background, and notwithstanding the enhancement of its role 
provided by the 2009 Treaty, the first post-Lisbon HR mostly acted as an executor 
and did not manage to participate in the policy-making phases. With the exception 
of the drafting of the regional strategy for the Sahel, the High Representative did 
not play an active role in turning the EU policy agenda to face the latent risk of a 
spread of terrorism in the EU neighbourhood. The strategy was prepared by the HR/
VP in collaboration with the Commission after the kidnapping of EU citizens, in 
October 2010, with the active participation of the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator. 
The regional strategy document highlighted that: “An urgent and a more recent 
priority is to prevent [Al-Qaida in the Maghreb] attacks in the Sahel region and its 
potential to carry out attacks on EU territory.”52 It also said: “improving security and 
development in Sahel has an obvious and direct impact on protecting European 
citizens and interests and on the EU internal security situation.” Nonetheless, 
Ashton did not actively participate in the general debate about EU priorities with 
regard to terrorism. In general terms, she “hesitated to draft any statement until 
she had cleared it with all 27 foreign ministers.”53 Furthermore, the tendency of 
the HR/VP to task her spokesperson to make statements regarding terrorist attacks 
reflected a rather limited interest of Lady Ashton in the matter. For all these reasons, 
one may argue that the counter-terrorism aspects contained in the strategy for the 
Sahel have been more the outcome of Member States’ requests to the HR, rather 
than the result of her own strategic priorities.
Even though the latent danger was clear, Lady Ashton did not play an active part 
in the formulation of policy proposals to face the risk of terrorist attacks. The first 
post-Lisbon HR/VP dedicated a large part of her time to the establishment of the 
European External Action Service (EEAS), which appeared as her “first and major 
priority.”54 The crisis in Ukraine, in turn, largely dominated the second part of her 
mandate as well as the agenda of the Foreign Affairs Council, which she chaired. In 
the face of the Arab Spring, Lady Ashton’s activity towards the region was mainly 
dedicated to the reframing of EU Southern Neighbourhood policy. A New Response 
to a Changing Neighbourhood: A Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy, 
was released in May 2011,55 elaborating further the so-called “conditionality 
approach.”56 The review was mainly aimed at supporting the democratic transition 
in Northern Africa and the Middle East through “more flexible approaches to 
cooperation” with the neighbourhood.57 The document stresses “continued 
52 European External Action Service, Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel, 
September 2011, par. 4, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/africa/docs/sahel_strategy_en.pdf.
53 Joylon Howorth, “Catherine Ashton’s Five-Year Term: A Difficult Assessment”, cit., p. 20.
54 Ibid., p. 8.
55 European Commission and High Representative of the Union, A new response to a changing 
neighbourhood. A review of European Neighbourhood policy (COM/2011/303), 25 May 2011, http://
eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=celex:52011DC0303.
56 See Rosa Balfour, “EU Conditionality after the Arab Spring”, in IEMed-EuroMeSCo Papers, No. 16, 
(June 2012), http://www.euromesco.net/images/papers/paperseuromesco16.pdf.
57 Alex MacKanzie, Christian Kaunert and Sarah Léonard, “EU Counterterrorism and the Southern 
Mediterranean Countries after the Arab Spring: New Potential for Cooperation?”, in Democracy and 
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counterterrorism cooperation is necessary” arguing “that is it important to support 
social and economic policies and reforms in a bid” to combat radicalisation.58 Yet, 
no particular measures to streamline EU external counter-terrorism measures were 
envisaged at the institutional or at policy level. Furthermore, terrorism was mostly 
conceptualised as one among other security concerns to take into consideration: 
listed right after “energy and resource security, climate change, non-proliferation” 
and only before “the fight against drugs.”59 The joint staff working document of 
the following year, A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity: Report on 
Activities in 2011 and Roadmap for Future Action mentions terrorism only briefly, 
as well.60
The deterioration of the security in the Sahel mentioned in the regional strategy 
was accelerated further by the Libyan and Malian crises. The former, in particular, 
provoked an inflow of weapons and armed combatants coming from Libya’s 
“Islamic Legion,” a Libyan paramilitary force founded by Gaddafi himself in 1972.61 
Unlike during Solana’s tenure, key political actors either abstained or issued 
statements that contradicted each other. Against such lack of agreement, the High 
Representative did not find space for playing a pro-active role in the decision-
making process or its implementation. Deep divisions among Member States 
on whether to intervene or not in both conflicts did hamper a timely design and 
efficient implementation of CSDP missions in the field, let alone the fight against 
terrorism. Both in the Libyan and Malian crises the EU failed to act in an integrated 
and timely manner leaving room for the same vacuum of power several reports had 
warned against when the Arab Spring first started. Probably, the widely proclaimed 
risk of a spread of terrorism was not felt as an imminent threat by Member States 
and institutions.
4. Mogherini’s tenure as High Representative: towards an 
enhanced integration in EU counter-terrorism policies?
While the ferocious beheadings were still a distant threat not yet shown on the TV 
screens and the shootings in European capitals were not yet current events, Federica 
Mogherini started actively engaging in the debate on the external dimension of EU 
counter-terrorism. Even if her mandate had not started yet, she was already making 
public interventions to prod the EU in this area. On the occasion of the August 2014 
Security, Vol. 9, No. 1-2 (2013), p. 148.
58 Ibid.
59 European Commission and High Representative of the Union, A new response to a changing 
neighbourhood, cit., par. 1.3.
60 European Commission and High Representative of the Union, Partnership for Democracy and 
Shared Prosperity: Report on activities in 2011 and Roadmap for future action (SWD/2012/121), 15 
May 2012, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=celex:52012SC0121.
61 Princy Marin George, “The Libyan crisis and the Western Sahel: Emerging Security 
Issues”, in IDSA Backgrounders, 14 August 2012, http://www.idsa.in/backgrounder/
TheLibyanCrisisandWestAfricanSahel_140812.html.
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informal foreign affairs ministers’ meeting in Milan (IT), she declared a long-term 
strategy would be needed to tackle the critical situation in Iraq, Libya and Syria and 
the problem of foreign fighters. A few days before the new HR officially started her 
mandate the Foreign Affairs Council adopted the EU counter-terrorism/foreign-
fighters strategy focusing on Syria and Iraq62 and “called on the High Representative 
of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European 
Commission to develop an EU comprehensive regional strategy” with the final aim 
of tackling “in a comprehensive and coordinated manner the crises in Syria and 
Iraq and the threat posed by Da’esh.”63
Against the political climate generated by the attacks in Europe and in its 
neighbourhood, Mogherini has managed to foster increased cooperation among 
Member States and institutions, taking advantage of their agreement and playing 
an autonomous political role. She did so through public declarations directed at 
shaping policy decisions and reframing “the interests of the Member States in a 
more integrated perspective,”64 with a conceptual effort to construct a common 
counter-value narrative based on education, faith and community dialogue; 
putting the spotlight on the issue and priorities to be discussed through her agenda-
setting power as Chair of the Foreign Affairs Council; and fostering, through her 
implementation tasks, bureaucratic and operational synergies among Member 
States and EU institutions. A few months after the beginning of her mandate, 
when a wave of terrorist attacks hit the European continent and the spread of 
violent extremism and terrorism in its neighbourhood became evident, Mogherini 
inverted the tendency undertaken by Lady Ashton to delegate declarations to the 
spokesperson. There were very few cases where Mogherini did not personally 
release the statement or declaration herself. Right after the Charlie Hebdo shootings 
in Paris, the HR/VP declared that “the fight against terrorism, in all its forms, is 
regularly at the heart of the work of the meetings of Foreign Ministers.”65 On the 
same occasion, the HR/VP said the Paris events strengthened her determination 
in the fight against terrorism and promised that she would put the issue on the 
agenda of the following Foreign Affairs Council.
Through her authority as chair of the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) and her 
capacity as Vice President of the Commission, Mogherini carved out for herself 
a role to influence most policy formulations. As promised, the extraordinary 
FAC discussed the external dimension of EU Counter-Terrorism as a first point 
62 Council of the European Union, Press Release: 3340th Council meeting Foreign Affairs 
(14451/14), Luxembourg, 20 October 2014, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/
docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/145218.pdf.
63 European Commission and High Representative of the Union, Elements for an EU regional 
strategy for Syria and Iraq as well as the Da’esh threat (JOIN/2015/2), 6 February 2015, p. 2, http://
eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=celex:52015JC0002.
64 Sergio Fabbrini, Which European Union? Europe after the Euro Crisis, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2015, p. 44.
65 High Representative of the Union, Statement on the attacks in Paris, 7 January 2015, http://eeas.
europa.eu/statements-eeas/2015/150107_05_en.htm.
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in the agenda on 19 January 2015. EU ministers set the basis for more effective 
cooperation among each other, through an increase in the sharing of information 
and best practices among EU capitals and with partner countries.66 The decision to 
establish the figure of security attachés within the EU delegations abroad was also 
taken. Exceptionally, on 19 January, the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, Gilles de 
Kerchove, participated in the discussions of the FAC. As the HR herself declared in 
the press conference following the gathering: “probably for the first time, there was 
a real deep awareness of the need to work together” and that the decision was taken 
“within the Foreign Affairs Council to coordinate in a much more active way than it 
has been the case so far.”67 Notably, the HR/VP even took a step further and called for 
the European Parliament to work on the Passenger Name Record as well fostering 
the prevention of financing of terrorist networks. “This is not the competence of 
the foreign affairs ministers” she said, “but still they are politicians and members of 
the national cabinets.”
Practical measures along the approach proposed by Mogherini were undertaken 
during the following Foreign Affairs Council, held on February 9th. The meeting 
concluded that the EU would “step up, as a matter of urgency, its external action on 
countering terrorism in particular in the Mediterranean, the Middle East, including 
Yemen, and North Africa, in particular also Libya, and the Sahel” and that counter-
terrorism would “be mainstreamed fully into EU foreign policy.”68 Using such 
conclusions as an input, the EU Council of 12 February, in turn, declared that the EU 
would take “this work forward promptly, fully involving the High Representative, 
the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator and the Member States.”69
Mogherini continued to shape the debate through official documents. The 
Regional Strategy for Syria and Iraq as well as the ISIL/Da’esh threat, prepared by 
the HR/VP and adopted on March 16th by the Foreign Affairs Council, discussed 
counter-terrorism in detail and stresses the need for complementarity between 
the activity of the EU and the Member States. As a budget of 1 billion euros was 
envisaged for the accomplishment of the objectives contained in the strategy, the 
strategic interests of the Commission seemed to be in line with the interests of 
the Member States as well. At the same time, the Commission’s proposal presented 
in April 2015 for a comprehensive European Agenda on Security, mainly focused 
on the internal dimension of the fight against terrorism,70 recognised that EU 
66 These included Turkey, Egypt, Gulf countries, North Africa and also Africa and Asia.
67 High Representative of the Union, Remarks at the press conference after the Foreign Affairs 
Council, 19 January 2015, http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/2015/150119_05_en.htm.
68 Council of the European Union, Council conclusions on counter-terrorism, 9 February 2015, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/02/150209-council-conclusions-
counter-terrorism.
69 European Council, Statement by the Members of the European Council, Informal Meeting of the 
Heads of State or Government, Brussels, 12 February 2015, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/
press/press-releases/2015/02/150212-european-council-statement-fight-against-terrorism.
70 Maria Giulia Amadio Viceré, “EU counterterrorism efforts and the role of High Representative 
Mogherini”, cit.
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action has to be “based on a coherent set of actions combining the internal and 
external dimensions, to further reinforce links between Justice and Home Affairs 
and Common Security and Defence Policy” (CSDP).71 Notably, a similar document 
was also presented by the Commission right after the bombings in London during 
Solana’s tenure.
The HR has not limited her activity to influencing the European public debate. She has 
also played a pro-active role in decision-making and implementation concerning 
the fight against terrorism in a broader effort to stabilise EU’s neighbourhood. At 
the end of March, for example, the EU’s foreign policy chief called for “a strong 
mandate to explore all possible ways, in which the European Union can, not only 
support a dialogue, but also support the outcome of a dialogue” in Libya.72 On that 
occasion, the HR “received what she had sought,”73 with EU leaders stating that the 
EU would make “full use of all its instruments” to support a government of national 
unity and Germany’s chancellor declaring that the EU’s efforts would be led by both 
Mogherini and the president of the European Council, Donald Tusk.
The current post holder is also the first HR able to launch a CSDP mission in only 
two months. Member States tasked the HR with the preparations for Common 
Security and Defence Policy mission to fight traffickers in the Mediterranean. 
This task was assigned at an extraordinary meeting of the European Council74 in 
the tense political atmosphere caused by the tragedy of 1,300 migrants who died 
trying to reach the Italian shores. In striking contrast to CSDP’s record, discussing 
the issue as the first item on the agenda, the Foreign Affairs Council launched 
Operation “European Union Naval Force Mediterranean” on 22 June 2015.75 The 
rapidity with which the bureaucratic and operational aspects of the preparation, 
mostly handled by the Commission, have been concluded testifies to an inter-
institutional convergence and coordinating role for the HR.
As EU leaders at the European Council held on 25-26 June were discussing and the 
High Representative was reporting on the implementation of the measures agreed 
at the informal meeting of February, brutal terrorist attacks took place, almost 
simultaneously, in Tunisia, France and Kuwait. In what appears as an infinite policy 
cycle, setting aside the evaluation of the counter-terrorism measures undertaken 
71 European Commission, The European Agenda on Security (COM/2015/185), 28 April 2015, p. 4, 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=celex:52015DC0185.
72 High Representative of the Union, Remarks upon arrival at the second day of the European 
Council, 20 March 2015, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/2015/150320_02_en.htm.
73 Andrew Gardner, “EU offers ‘full support’ for Libya”, in Politico. European Voice, 20 March 2015, 
http://www.politico.eu/article/eu-offers-full-support-for-libya.
74 European Council, Special meeting of 23 April 2015, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/
meetings/european-council/2015/04/23.
75 Council of the European Union, Outcome of the Council Meeting, 3400th Council meeting 
Foreign Affairs, Luxembourg, 22 June 2015, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/
fac/2015/06/Outcome-of-the-Council-meeting_EN_pdf. Right after the gathering, Mogherini 
herself noted, that this was the first time that Member States had agreed by consensus on an 
operation decided only two months earlier.
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in the past months, Mogherini got back on stage to shape the EU’s reaction. Her 
first declaration on the attacks appeared on the social networks, “Tunisia, Kuwait, 
France: Europe and Arab world united as victims and in the response. Terrorists 
want to divide us; they unite us even more.”76 The efforts of the HR/VP as policy 
entrepreneur are not over. In the official EU European Council conclusions held 
on 25-26 June 2015, Member States agreed that the High Representative would 
continue the process of strategic reflection with a view to preparing an EU global 
strategy on foreign and security policy in June 2016.
Conclusions
A common denominator of the tenures of the three High Representatives has been 
the occurrence of three sets of events potentially providing the impetus for action 
within the EU. However, the comparison of the three cases indicates that whilst 
during the mandates of Solana and Mogherini, the HR was able to play a key pro-
active role and foster more integrated policies in EU counter-terrorism, during her 
tenure, Lady Ashton, who had the same institutional job description as the current 
post-holder, mainly acted as an administrative executor. How was that possible?
A convergence of interests among Member States and the institutions is, in principle, 
a pre-condition for the High Representative to play a pro-active role in the external 
dimension of EU counter-terrorism. In these situations, the HR might have the 
opportunity to exercise leadership and “steer the ship” towards coordinated and 
therefore more effective policies.77 Taking advantage of the strategic convergence 
among national governments and institutions, notwithstanding the institutional 
limitations of its function, Solana played an active part in the shaping of a more 
integrated EU counter-terrorism policy. Indeed, a security crisis did take place 
during Lady Ashton’s mandate as well. Admittedly, the threat perceived by the 
Members States was not as high as in the other two cases generating an insufficient 
functional pressure for a convergence among the strategic interests of the main 
actors to occur. Bearing divergent national positions during and in the immediate 
aftermath of turmoil in the MENA region, Member States retained and strongly 
exerted all their control on EU foreign and security policy. Such control prevented 
the HR/VP from undertaking a decisive action and coordinating a comprehensive 
and effective response to the security threat deriving from the vacuum left by 
failing states in the European neighbourhood. Considering the limited activity of 
Lady Ashton in shaping the public debate and formulating proposals, it remains 
open to question, had such convergence occurred, whether she would have taken 
advantage of it. Until now Mogherini has enjoyed and taken advantage of a similar 
alignment of preferences as the one encountered by Solana. The rapid increase 
76 Federica Mogherini on Twitter, 26 June 2015, https://twitter.com/federicamog/
status/614417129450942465.
77 Maria Giulia Amadio Viceré, “EU counterterrorism efforts and the role of High Representative 
Mogherini”, cit.
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of ferocious attacks on European territory and its neighbourhood, together with 
the urgent necessity to stabilise failing states providing a safe haven for violent 
extremism and terrorist networks, has set the basis for agreement among EU 
institutions and Member States. In principle, all the conditions are in place for the 
EU to make a difference in the fight against terrorism in the international arena. 
The development of its counter-terrorism policies demonstrates that integration 
in the EU foreign and security domain is not an absolute impossibility. Yet, such 
integration is largely contingent: it runs in parallel with Member States’ threat 
perception and depends on the personal characteristics and attitude of the HR in 
place. Hopefully, such set of conditions will be there long enough for the EU to 
develop an effective and long-lasting approach to its fight against terrorism.
Updated 2 September 2015
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